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the care that a person 
and 
at all places where there is reasonable 
persons or therefrom. 
[3] Id.-Injuries-Inspection.-Persons control] electric power 
lines have of reasonable inspection of wires 
and appliances and should therein. 
!d.-Injuries-Degree of Care.-Where cement company could 
have had an electric its deenergized, 
and could have for night work 
and proper the care of it must be measured 
by hazard inherent in wires with duty 
it owed to contractor's who were injured when con-
tractor's crane came into contact with such wires while 
engaged in work on rock crusher at 
night, and who were as to company, insofar as it had control of 
premises, invitees or business visitors rather than licensees or 
trespassers. 
[1] Liability for from electric notes 14 A.L.R. 
1023; 56 A.L.R. 1021. See also Cal.Jur.2d, E!ectrie Companies, 
§ 15 et seq.; Am.Jur., Electricity, § 74 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 4] Eleetricity, § 17; [2] Electricity, 
§ 21(2); [3] Electricity, § 16; [5] Independent Contractors, § 22; 
[6] Negligence, §57; [7] Negligenee, § 74; [8, 11] Electricity, 
§29; [9] Negligence, §19; [10] Negligence, §16; [12] Negligence, 
§ 44(3); [13] Negligence, § 150; [14, 16] Negligence, §§ 32, 33; 
[15] Negligence,§ 32; [17] § 33; [18] Electricity,§ 35; 
[19] Electricity,§ 33(4); [20, 21] Negligence,§ 176; [22] Electric-




trol of any 
to others, for whose 





[8] Electricity-Injuries-Evidence.-In action 
ployees cement company for 
eon tractor's crane came into eoutn ct -with 
company's 
eon1pany \YHS 
of injuries is sustained 
conclude that, as company that contractor's 
cranes operated in vicinity of power unless power was 
cut off a danger existed; that work called for 
and lighting was such that wires were not visible; that com-
pany should han' that boom of crmw 
in contact with wires to 
to place where would 
adequate basis for would 
discover condition or realize involved. 
[9] Negligence-Proximate Cause- Concurrent Causes.-Defend-
ant's negligence need not be sole cause of 1s 
if it is factor which i~ of 
[10] Id.- Proximate Cause- Intervening Causes.--If reali:cable 
likelihood that third person may act 
hazard or one of hazards which makes such 
act whether 
criminal doPs not pn•n•nt actor 
caused 
[11] Electricity-Injuries-Evidence.-In action eontrartor's 
employees sustained when 
[7] 
§ 97. 
[9] See Cal.Jur., 
§ 63 et seq. 
§53 et seq.; Am.Jur., 
Negligence, § 9 seq.; Am.Jur., 
227 
of is 




available when there has been 





ccmcnt company for injuries sustaiw'd 
crane cnrne into contact with high voltage 
an oflen•d instruction 
that would 
exercise of ordinary care they should 
risk rather than that they 
at Hight, erro-
'"'~mnptwn of risk was 
in p1·c \\'h<·n· eourt did not 
doctri nc of of risk 
gaye the jury the elements of the 
stances. 
of Law and Fact--Contributory Neg-
consideration to 
disturbance or peril 
of memory; to 
of ordinary care. 
[21] of Law and 
Where person must v.rork in of uoi>MlJle 
constitutes 
of care which he is bound to exercise may 
be less by reason of of attention to his work 
than would otherwise be case; whether or not he was guilty 
of contributory on all facts disclosed by evidence 
is jury question, and rule is not different whether danger is 
stationary or 




tor's employees cement company for 
when contractor's crane came into contact 
wires on company's at night, it is 
jury that it was to use 
nish plaintiffs with to work and to warn them 
which it knew or in exercise of 
and that if company knew or 
care should have known that work of 
company was 
prevent occurrence of injuries re<ct>il>wot 




Actions for damages for 
plaintiffs affirmed. 




Knauf for Respondents. 
were caused burns vvhen a crane came in 
contact with an overhead conduit of 
Defendant from the 
diets. It asserts that the evidence vvas insufficient to establish 
any on its 
its part was not the 
plaintiffs were 
that any claimed negligence on 
and error vvas committed in the 
of the injuries; that 
as a matter of law; 
of instructions to the 
jury. 
Defendant owns and operates a plant for the manufacture 
of cement on a plot of about 6 acres of ground. A contract 
was made between it and Haddock Company to perform, as 
extensive alteration and construe-
and and Haddock was en-
m work for defendant on one of defend-
ant's rock crushers at the time of the accident on ,January 
10, 1947. Plaintiffs were Haddock's employees. The job was 
a "rush" job and it was known by defendant that the work 
would as well as work. At all times de-
fendant continued the operation of its plant night and day. 
It retained control of its premises and plant, although not 
of Haddock's employees, equipment and operations, and had 
a man on the job (lVIr. Brophy, at the time here pertinent) 
whose duties were to observe Haddock's work and to represent 
defendant in connection therewith. Haddock was to inter-
fere as little as possible in its work with the operation by de-
fendant of its plant. Defendant through its supervisory 
employees knew that Haddock frequently used cranes with 
60-foot booms* in its work; that the cranes worked in various 
*A crane as referred to consists of a mobile truck or tractor on 
which is mounted a boom and the machinery necessary to raise and 
defendant's 
crusher to be ~mhn'""'rl 
the road, and about from the 
owned and maintained an uninsulated three-wire power line 
carrying 33,000 volts for usc defendant in its 
The wires were 43.8 feet above the 
the line >vas owned by 
and the request would be shut 
off-the line In fact the 
granted on previous occasions. Haddock had no 
have the lines deenergized. Such would stop 
the operation of defendant's cause no dam-
age thereto other than the loss of the shut-
down and the and is a simple 
process of opening and a switch. The crusher repair 
job would take several hours. There also was no obstacle 
to the posting of defendant. poles sup-
porting the 1vires had notices of presumably 
placed there by California.) In addition to the general 
knowledge of defendant of the cranes operating 
near p01ver lines, it had that the deener-
gization of those lines, when cranes were near 
the power lines, was a proper precaution. Prior to 
the repair job on the crusher in and in connection 
therewith, Haddock's Martin requested de-
fendant's superintendent that the power be shut off 
so it would be safe to move a crane about and Brophy refused 
because it would the shutdown of defendant's plant. 
(There is considerable conflict on this issue but the 
is reasonably susceptible of the ) It could be 
inferred that defendant knew the same would 
be needed for the safety of Haddock's men 
ary lOth repair of the crusher but should not 
dock to make the request in view of the recent refusal. 
lower it and its cables. The operator of the boom performed his work 
in a cab on the truck or tractor and the driver of the truck or 
tractor performed his function from a cab on the truck or tractor. 
of 
a structure in which rock 





of the crusher 
5:30 and 6 o'clock. 
the power line was not visible; 
to ·work on the crane. To fit 
of three cables on 
of which was the lifting hook. 
in rigging. The boom was parallel 
five or six feet above the ground. 
had been done and plaintiffs went to 
the headache ball, a weight to be at-
hook to keep the cables taut and in 
to the end of the cable and 
the boom had been raised to about 
4:-i and the truck had been moved toward the 
po·wer line to shorten the distance the ball would have to be 
carried. The hook was several feet above the ground. Plain-
tiffs ·were the ball together and Austin grasped the 
hook to attach the b~Jll. The hook was charged with elec-
line. 
the 
of the boom to the power 
the hook, the electricity flowed 
and Boehm resulting in the injuries 
were awarded. 
'fl1is court stated the rule with reference to 
owed by one who has control of electricity. " 'On 
the standard of care is, that one main-
electricity is required to exercise 
person of ordinary prudence would exercise 
nnder the the circumstances are the 
character of electricity and the in-
to persons or property if it escapes. 
nsed must be commensurate with and pro-
he rent 
to that 
plication of that ;:,cauu.:u 




tality and force 
inspection of the 
therein. 
probability of 
safe by proper 
& Tel. Co., 157 Cal. 
vigilant and 








true that California rather than defendant was maintaining 
the power line, yet defendant had control the extent that 
it could have the line and it controlled its 
premises it could provide 
and proper warnings. Hence care 
be measured by the hazard inherent in highly charged wires 
together with the it owed to Haddock's employees 
(plaintiffs) who were as to insofar as it had 
control of the premises, invitees or business visitors rather 
than licensees or ; that their status was invitees is 
clear. (Delk v. 118 529 [258 
P.2d 75]; Larnar v. John & Wade, Inc., 70 Cal.App.2d 806 
[161 P.2d 970]; Bazzoli v. Nance's Inc., 109 Cal. 
App.2d 232 [240 P.2d 672]; v. A. F. Mattock Co., 
15 Cal.2d 622 [104 P.2d ; La j}falfa v. Piornbo Bros., 70 
Cal.App.2d 840 [161 P.2d 964]; Prosser on Torts, p. 636.) 
[5] "One who entrusts work to an independent contrac-
tor, but who retains the control of any of the work, 
is subject to liability for harm to others, for whose 
safety the employer owes a to exercise reasonable care, 
which is caused by his failure to exercise his control with 
reasonable care .... The employer may, however, retain a 
control less than that which is necessary to subject him to 
liability as master. He may retain the power to direct 
the order in which the work shall be done or to forbid its 
being done in a manner to be to himself or 
others. Such a supervisory control may not subject him to 
liability under the of but he may be 
liable under the rule stated in this Section unless he exercises 




was the cause of 
could conclude that, knowing 
that Haddock's cranes operated in the 
of the power unless the power was cut off a 
existed; that work called for night operation and 
the lighting was such that the wires were not visible; that 
it should have that the boom of the crane might 
wires the electricity to 
where it would cause injury; that 
there was not basis for believing that Haddock's 
employees would discover the condition or realize the danger 
involved because the wires were not visible and the employees 
might assume that they were not charged or they 
might have their presence due to the 
rush and nature of the work. 
Defendant refers to the of Martin, Haddock's 
superintendent, that he knew of the presence of the wires 
when the work on the crusher was being done and that 
of plaintiffs that knew of the wires. Martin's testimony 
was contradictory and could have been disbelieved by the 
jury. The jury could have concluded that while plaintiffs 
knew of the of the the nature of the 
job and were such that the danger was 
not so obvious to that defendant would be relieved 
of liability. 
Stress is also laid upon the duty under the statutes and 
regulations and that it was Haddock's nondelegable duty 
such an act whether 
tortious or criminal does 
liable for harm eaused 
It has been held that the 
Hestatement of Torts, sections 
in this state. (Slasulat v. Pacific 
Cai.2ll 631 [67 P.2d . ) " (111 osley v. 
2G Cal.2c1 219 [157 P.2d 372, 158 
relic~d upon by defendant are dis-
iu v. Paranwunt Pro-
287 [91 P.2d 231], among other 
diff'el'Clicces there 1ras no knowledge by defendant of the use 
the work in progress. 'l'he \York \vas not a 
;mel was done in the daylight. 
(! i:,enc:siull is also 11ertinent to the 
q twstion On the basis of the 
<Jbono ;heussed e\iclenee the jury was justified in finding 
iuti ffs were fn•e from contributory negligence. ·while 
haYe obserYed the wires on defendant's prem-
of have momen-
their presence under the circumstances. 
mar be in aeeorcl with the con-
man. (See Bickham v. Sonthern 
Cal.App.2cl 815 [263 P.2d 32] ; 
L. & P. Corp., 21 Cal.App.2d 376 
Oas <f' E1u:. Co., 4;3 Cal.2d 
and eases citecl 
;.;hon!1l lw emphasized tllat the qnes-
cause and contributory negli-
cireumsiancrs snch as we have here are to be 
determined the trier of fact. (Nev'is v. Pacific Gas & 
F!1c. Co., supra, 43 Cal.2cl 62G.) 
Defendant asserts 
matter of law. 
plaintiffs did not assume the risk. 
tion of risk was recently stated 
of assumption of risk and 
on different theories. 
a lack of due care. 
the other hand, will 
that plaintiff may have acte(1 with due 
is available when there has been a 
a 
of 
a risk and such acceptance, whether express or has 
been made with knowledge and of the risk 
[16] ·where the fads are such that the must have 
had knowledge of the hazard, the situation is to 
actual knowledge, and there may be an of the 
risk, but \Yhere it merely appears that he should or could 
have discovered the danger by the exercise of 
the defense is contributory negligence and not of 
risk." (Prescott v. Ralphs Grocery 42 Cal.2d 158, 161-162 
[265 P.2d 904].) [17] Defendant's offered instruc-
tions on the defense of assumption of risk were refused but 
the basic one was erroneous under the Prescott case in that 
it advised the jury that plaintiffs would have assumed the 
risk if in the exercise of ordinary care should have 
known of and appreciated the risk rather than that they 
must have had knowledge of the danger. The other instruc-
tions were connected with the basie one and would have been 
confusing if the basic one were not given. Such instructions 
are erroneous and the trial court was under no to revise 
them to state the law accurately. 
Oo., supra, 42 Cal.2d 158; Hayes v. Richfield Oil Corp., 38 
Cal.2d 375 [240 P.2d 580) ; 'l'ossman v. 37 Cal.2d 
522 [233 P.2d 1] .) 
[18] 'fhe court, howeYer, on its initiative gave an instruc-
tion that it was not instructing on "the doctrine of assumption 
of risk because that doctrine is not in this case. 
However, the court is instructing you on the doctrine of con-
tributory negligence" and the instructions on that issue 
will govern your deliberations on the issne of 
negligence. The evidence would have instruction 
on assumption of risk; however, we believe wl1ile assump-
tion of risk and contributory negligence are distinguishable 
a matter Bnt to 
or to be in a state of abstraction or absent-mindedness or to 
err in may or may not on 
whether or not in the circumstances it shows a want of 
ordinary care. Also the must consider the character 
of the notice whether recent remote and the 
impression such information would make upon the mind of 
an like situation.'' (Empha-
misconduct nor is he 
care." And: " ... a 
of his faculties of 
the lawful of 
not 
negligent. 
bar recovery unless such 






Defendant's main contention is that the instruction is not 
correct statement of the law in that '-'"V"'""c'u 
indicate lack of unless 
confronted with a sudden and 
It should 
on contributory neg-
stated in many cases. As expressed 
recent ones, whether of a 
is a ques-
consideration to the circum-
no sudden disturbance or peril 
the lapse of memory; to 
unless it shows a want of ordinary 
the is one for the (Hayes v. 
s1.tpra, 38 Cal.2d 385; Kirk v. Los 
26 Cal.2d 840 [161 P.2d 673, 164 
Inc., 19 Cal.2d 647, 656 [122 
P.2d 576]; Gibson v. County Mendocino, 16 Cal.2d 80, 89 
[105 P.2d ; Hall v. Barber Door Co .. , 218 Cal. 412, 420 
[23 P.2d 1lleindersee v. 188 Cal. 503-504 
[205 P. 1078] ; Giraudi :v. Electric Co., 107 Cal. 120, 125 
[40 P. 48 28 L.R.A. 596]; Smith v. 
Southern Pac. Co., 201 Cal. 57 [255 P. 500] ; Roseberry v. 
Edward F. Niehaus & Co., 166 Cal. 481, 483 [137 P. 232] ; 
Jacobson v. Oakland Jl!Ieat etc. Co., 161 Cal. 430 [119 P. 
653, Ann.Cas. 1913B 1194]; Harris v. Joffe, 28 Cal.2d 418, 
425 [170 P.2d ; see cases collected 19 Cal.Jur. 587-593, 
Co. [ 44 C.2d 
) Such cases 
162 CaL 327 
mentioning the circumstances 
'\vas well summarized in Lindre v. 
351 [190 P.2d 47], quoting from 
174 [263 P. 255]: "'The rule 
of la\Y contended for is as foilows: Momentary forgetfulness 
of a known not induced by a sudden and adequate dis-
negligence, qualifying this by 
is not negligence unless it shows a 
\rant of care. 'l'he qualification is not absolute but 
npon the facts of the particular case. There is a long 
line of cases that forgetfulness is as a matter of law 
that \Yill defeat recovery cases.] It is upon 
that bases her claim of contributory 
However, as is said in 
Jacobson v. Oakland Meat [&Packing] Co., 161 CaL [425] 430 
P. Ann.Cas. 1913B 1194], one element in all these 
\Yith the danger he forgot. 
standanl of negligence per se the 
rule that if one may be charged with a knowledge, past or 
of a , he is precluded from recovery for in-
sustained therefrom and let the rule rest there for all 
("ases -would be to establish a doctrine dangerous in its applica-
timJ and unsound in principle and one not warranted by the 
prrsent of Courts are nnwilling to declare 
tlwt kno'xn danger ahvays amounts to negligence 
v. Oakland JJJ~eat [& Packing] Co., supra, [161 
'l'he true rule to be deduced from the cases cited 
is tl1nt the shown must be under circumstances 
sufflr:ient to enable a court to determine that such lack of 
memory constituted per se . .. .' " 
;\pr.J!J,):J] AL'STIX 1'. HrnmsmE PoR'!'L:\::-.:n 
[44 C.2d 225; 69] 
Defendant aHaeks tlw 
unusual 
necessities of such a m so 
caution that he may talw for his own 
of caution required of him 
care." It contends that here 
did not require them to work on the erane 
imity to the wires and the wires 1ver·c not 
they were stationary and 43 feet aboYe 
seen, there is evidence tl1at the work \\·as (lone 
manner and place and plaintifrs \\'Pre 
It is urged that the rule aunolmcerl in 
applies to persons ·whose ·work must be 
streets where there are 
zani Motors, Lid., 109 Cal 
[21] It has long been recognized that ". where a pN'son 
must work in a position of possible the amount of care 
which he is bound to ('xereise for his O\•:n 
be less by reason of the of his 
work than would othenvise be the case. 
Portland Cement Go., 162 Cal. 40 [120 P. 
American Smelling etc. 3+ CaL\pp.2c1 
P.2d 841]; Mecham v. Crump, 1:37 
Ji30 P.2d 568] ; Woods Y. 1;3:) 
[ 24 P.2d 8631; Jones v. Ilcdgcs, 12:3 Cal 
P.2d 111]; Driscoll v. St. B. R. 
208, 215 et seq. [250 P. ]062] .) Wlwther or not zlent 
was guilty of eontributory 
rlosed by the eYic1enc(; \Ya'' a jm',l' y 
B('thlehem etc. Gorp., ();) Cal 7!J5. 801 fi-17].) 
\Ve see no rrason why the rule should be (1iffercnt \Yhether the 
danger is stationary or 'l'he of whether 
plaintiffs were acting as pc·rsons of 
the circumstances \Yas left to i he am1 
others on the same 
[22] The following jnry im:;tructions are In-
struction No. 64: "It was the duty of the defendant cement 
to 
are affirmed. 
No. 5!343. In Bank. 6, 
In re W .. 'l.RREN E. BARTGES, on Habeas 
Evidence--Judicial Notice-Laws of Sister States.-In 
of of Code Civ. Proc., § subd. 
notice be taken of statutory definition crime 
it is mistake for appellate court to state that, there 
evidence to contrary, it will be assumed that law 
to crimes charged as prior convictions in sister 
as it is in California. 
[2] Habeas Corpus-Grounds for Relief-Excess of Jurisdiction.-
Petitioner's contention on habeas corpus that 
him in consolidated criminal cases were incorrect 
power of superior court to make District Court of 
to affirm) in determining that two of three 
(the charges of which had been 
moot where, after of for habeas 
District Ceurt of Appeal recalled its remittitur and modified 
trial court's judgments so as to recite one convic-
tion, and sheriff then filed return which shows 
that petitioner is held under modified abstraet of 
which show only one prior since he has 
relief in that to which he was entitled. 
[3] Criminal Law-Habitual Offenders-Review.-Where 
ant was sentenced to serve consecutive terms on two 
counts of which he was found guilty, but 
found that defendant suffered three 
the charges of two of which had been dismissed 
supported by proof, it cannot be said on habeas 
trial court's unwarranted determination as to numhrr of 
convictions did not influence it 
[1] See Cal.Jnr.2d, Evidence, § 27; 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Evidence, § 37; 
§ 9; [3] Criminal Law, § 1459; [4] Criminal 
[ 5] Habeas Corpus, § 2; [ !3, 7] Habeas § 65. 
to 
